Martin v. Reed, 147 S.W.3d 860 (Mo. App. S.D. 2004)
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- Citation: 147 S.W.3d 860 (Mo. App. S.D. 2004); 2004 WL 2416240; 2004 Mo. App. LEXIS 1585. No. 25978. Decided Oct. 29, 2004. Opinion by Shrum, J.; Parrish, P.J., and Bates, C.J., concur.
- Court / Year: Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District, Division Two; 2004
- Topic tags: contract_for_deed | breach | forfeiture (raised but not reached) | specific_performance | appellate_briefing_preservation
- Facts: Defendants Charles and Lois Reed had owned a farm and conveyed it to Dale and Glendora Martin in 1992 (in substance to satisfy a debt Charles owed Dale). The Martins then signed a March 1992 “contract for deed” back to the Reeds: 1,000/month use arrangement, then an arrangement letting the Reeds live in the farmhouse rent-free in exchange for tending Dale’s cattle. After Dale died, Glendora transferred the property to the Glendora Martin Family Trust, which sued to recover possession. The Reeds counterclaimed for specific performance of the contract for deed and a declaratory judgment of their rights, claiming the price had been paid through cattle-business profits and that Dale had told them the interest clause was a sham inserted only to avoid IRS imputed-interest issues.
- Holding: Affirmed. The trial court’s judgment — that the trust (Martin side) owned the property, that the Reeds breached the contract for deed by failing to pay the contractually required interest, and that the parties thereafter mutually abandoned/rescinded the contract and entered an oral landlord-tenant (month-to-month) relationship — was supported by substantial evidence and turned on credibility findings the appellate court deferred to under Murphy v. Carron. The Reeds’ appellate points were dismissed on briefing-preservation grounds, not decided on their substantive merits.
- Reasoning:
- Point I (forfeiture/waiver) dismissed as multifarious and unpreserved. The point grouped unrelated claims in violation of Rule 84.04 and “preserves nothing for appellate review.” Sub-arguments were abandoned for lack of development, and the waiver defense was forfeited because it was raised for the first time in a new-trial motion rather than pleaded.
- The court expressly found there was no forfeiture to review. The opinion states the trial court “never ruled that a forfeiture occurred”; it held only (1) that the Reeds breached the contract and (2) that the parties voluntarily entered an oral lease afterward. The Reeds’ brief faulted the trial court “for a ruling it never made.” The phrase that the contract “did not contain a forfeiture provision” appears in the opinion as part of the court’s recitation of the appellants’ (Reeds’) Point I contention, not as a finding by the court. The court recited the general Missouri principle that “forfeitures are not favored by the law and courts will not supply a forfeiture clause in a contract where none exists” (citing Bagby v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. Co., 171 S.W.2d 673, 675 (Mo. 1943)) and said “We do not disagree,” but then expressly declined to apply it for the Reeds: “this is not a deed or gift case… This is a contract for deed case,” and the appellants “never discuss how those concepts are to be applied, in a party’s favor, when that party breaches the contract.” Martin is therefore not controlling authority for the “will not supply a forfeiture clause” rule as applied to a CFD — it recited and sidestepped it; the underlying rule rests on Bagby.
- Default-by-the-breaching-party rationale. Because the Reeds were the first to breach (never paying interest), they could not claim the benefit of the contract: “a material breach may excuse another party’s performance” (Schaefer v. Rivers) and “a party to a contract cannot claim its benefits when he or she is the first to violate it” (Boten v. Brecklein). This is why the specific-performance counterclaim failed — not any holding about forfeiture-vs-foreclosure remedies.
- Point II (judge conflict) denied as untimely (raised after judgment) and because a judge’s prior unrelated adversarial relationship with a party does not mandate disqualification absent shown bias.
- Practical impact for CFD operators/buyers: Martin v. Reed is narrow. Its real lessons are: (1) a contract-for-deed buyer who never performs cannot obtain specific performance — the first material breacher cannot enforce the contract; (2) here the seller recovered the land not by a forfeiture ruling at all but because the trial court found the parties mutually abandoned the CFD and substituted a lease; and (3) appellate forfeiture arguments must be properly preserved and briefed (Rule 84.04). The general “courts will not supply a forfeiture clause where none exists” rule is real (Bagby), but Martin recited and declined to apply it, so the case should not be cited as the holding for it. The case does not hold that Missouri enforces CFD forfeiture clauses, does not address whether a contract for deed must be foreclosed like a mortgage, and contains no “election of remedies / mutually exclusive remedies” or “not yet treated as a conventional mortgage” holding. It should not be cited for any of those propositions.
- Good-law status: Good law. Published, never overruled or superseded; cited subsequently by Missouri courts. Verified against the full opinion text (Harvard Caselaw Access Project) and the CourtListener case record (Oct. 29, 2004; No. 25978).
- Source (retrieved): https://static.case.law/sw3d/147/cases/0860-01.json (Harvard CAP, full opinion text) · https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1353074/martin-v-reed/ (CourtListener record: citation, court, date, docket, judge) · Verified: 2026-06-08
Jurisdictions that follow / cite: missouri
Disclaimer. Legal information, not legal advice. Confirm the opinion is still good law before relying on it.