Morton v. Nguyen, 412 S.W.3d 506 (Tex. 2013)

Legal information, not legal advice. Verify against the cited opinion.

  • Citation: Morton v. Nguyen, 412 S.W.3d 506, 56 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 955 (Tex. 2013) (No. 12-0539).
  • Court / Year: Supreme Court of Texas, decided August 23, 2013 (opinion by Justice Green).
  • Topic tags: disclosure · forfeiture · remedies · cancel-and-rescind · restitution-offset
  • Facts: Kevin Morton (seller) conveyed residential property to Hung and Carol Nguyen (buyers) under a contract for deed (executory contract for the conveyance of real property) governed by Chapter 5, Subchapter D of the Texas Property Code. The buyers paid a down payment and made roughly 34 monthly payments over almost three years, and also paid taxes and insurance premiums. Because Morton failed to provide the buyers with all the information and disclosures Subchapter D requires of a seller, the Nguyens notified Morton in November 2009 that they were exercising their statutory right to “cancel and rescind” the contract for deed under § 5.069(d). They demanded a full refund of all payments made — the down payment, the 34 monthly payments, and the taxes and insurance they had paid. The trial court awarded the buyers their payments in full as actual damages for cancellation and rescission, and the court of appeals affirmed. Morton sought review, arguing the buyers also had to give back the value of their nearly-three-year occupation of the home.
  • Holding: Subchapter D’s cancellation-and-rescission remedy contemplates mutual restitution of benefits among the parties. While the buyer remains entitled to a “full refund of all payments made to the seller,” rescission also requires the buyer to restore to the seller the value of the benefit the buyer received under the contract — here, the reasonable rental value of the buyers’ interim occupation of the property. The buyer’s recovery is therefore net: payments back, less the value of occupation. The Court reversed the actual-damages awards (which had given the buyers a full refund without any occupation offset) and remanded.
  • Reasoning: The statutory remedy is restorative, not punitive. Like the Deceptive Trade Practices Act’s restoration remedy, Subchapter D’s cancel-and- rescind option “merely provides the buyer the option of unwinding the transaction.” Rescission at common law “requires a mutual restoration and accounting, in which each party restores property received from the other,” and the Court read the statute against that backdrop rather than as a one-way refund. Allowing a buyer to recover every payment while keeping the benefit of years of occupancy “would result in a windfall inconsistent with the general nature of Subchapter D’s cancellation-and-rescission remedy.” Accordingly, the buyers had to restore supplemental enrichment in the form of rent for their interim occupation upon cancellation and rescission. (The Court also treated the offset as akin to the affirmative defense of offset/setoff, which must be pleaded.)
  • Practical impact for CFD operators/buyers: Morton is the controlling Texas authority on what a disclosure-violation rescission actually costs the seller. A Subchapter D disclosure failure still hands the buyer a powerful unwind right — but the refund is not a free ride: the buyer must credit the seller for the reasonable rental/use value of the time they lived in the property. For operators, this caps the downside of a § 5.069/§ 5.070 disclosure slip — the exposure is the net of payments-in minus occupation-value, not the gross of every dollar collected. For buyers, the rescission remedy remains real and complete (down payment, installments, taxes, insurance all recoverable) but is reduced by the fair rental value of occupancy, so the practical recovery on a long-occupied property can be modest. Sellers defending a rescission claim must plead the occupation-value offset to obtain it. See texas §§ 3, 3b, 8.
  • Good-law status: Good law. Decided 2013; not overruled, superseded by statute, or limited. It remains the Texas Supreme Court’s controlling statement on mutual restitution under the Subchapter D cancel-and-rescind remedy and is routinely cited in Texas executory-contract practice. The downstream open question it leaves — the precise measure of the buyer’s offset (reasonable rental value vs. fair use value) — is the post-Morton litigation point, not a challenge to the holding itself.
  • Source (retrieved):

▸ For Sellers / Operators — A Subchapter D disclosure violation gives the buyer the right to cancel and rescind and demand back every payment — down payment, installments, taxes, and insurance. Morton is the case that keeps that from being a total loss: the buyer must restore the reasonable rental value of their occupation, so your net exposure is payments-in minus the use value of the time they lived there. Two operating takeaways: (1) the rescission downside is real but net, not gross; (2) if you are defending the claim, you must affirmatively plead the occupation-value offset to get it — it is treated like setoff. The cleanest protection is still to deliver the full § 5.069/§ 5.070 disclosure packet so the rescission right never arises. See texas and forfeiture-vs-foreclosure.

▸ For Buyers — If the seller skipped the required disclosures, you can unwind the deal and recover your payments — but Morton requires you to give back the fair rental value of the time you occupied the home, so your refund is reduced accordingly. On a property you lived in for years, the net recovery may be smaller than the total you paid.

Jurisdictions that follow / cite: texas (controlling) — interpreting Tex. Prop. Code Subchapter D (§ 5.069(d)). Compare the parallel statutory-penalty case flores-v-millennium-interests-2005 (§ 5.077 liquidated damages are a penalty recoverable without proof of harm); see the remedy map in forfeiture-vs-foreclosure.


Disclaimer. Legal information, not legal advice. Morton turns on the Texas Subchapter D statutory remedy and the measure of the buyer’s occupation offset; outcomes vary with the facts and the pleadings. Confirm the opinion is still good law and consult a licensed Texas attorney before relying on it.