Triplett v. Davis, 238 Ark. 870, 385 S.W.2d 33 (Ark. 1964)
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- Citation: 238 Ark. 870, 385 S.W.2d 33 (1964).
- Court / Year: Arkansas Supreme Court, 1964.
- Topic tags: forfeiture | waiver | course_of_dealing
- Facts: Martha McCoy and her husband entered a 15-year “Rental Contract and Option to Purchase” for 80 acres (~400 evidenced by notes); time was made of the essence. Six annual payments were made promptly, but the buyer fell delinquent on the 1961 and 1962 notes and the seller granted extensions and accepted late payments. When the January 1963 payment was missed, the seller (appellant Triplett) declared a forfeiture and, when the buyers then offered the full balance, refused it and insisted on the forfeiture. Less than half the purchase price had been paid when forfeiture was declared. The chancellor found the seller had waived the forfeiture and decreed conveyance to the buyer.
- Holding (corrected — this is a WAIVER case, not a substantial-equity case): “Forfeiture provisions are valid and enforceable in contracts for the sale of land” (citing White v. Page, 216 Ark. 632 (1950)) — “However, forfeiture provisions may be waived by the acts and conduct of the parties.” Because the seller had granted extensions, accepted delinquent payments, and “lull[ed] the appellee into an assurance of another extension,” he waived his express right of forfeiture; the chancellor’s waiver finding was affirmed. The court’s “equity abhors a forfeiture” language is used in the waiver sense: “equity abhors a forfeiture and will seize upon slight circumstances that indicate a waiver in order to prevent forfeiture.” Triplett does NOT hold that forfeiture is barred by substantial equity, that the contract must be treated as an equitable mortgage, or that the seller must foreclose. (The buyer here had paid less than half.)
- Reasoning: Forfeiture is a harsh remedy; before it is enforced, equity requires strict compliance with the contract’s important terms even where there is an express forfeiture clause (Williams v. Shaver, 100 Ark. 565 (1911)). A seller who has not insisted on strict compliance — who indulged extensions and accepted late payments — cannot suddenly declare a forfeiture; equity treats the right as waived and will relieve against the forfeiture.
- Disposition: Affirmed (decree for the buyer; forfeiture waived).
- Practical impact for CFD operators/buyers: Triplett is foundational Arkansas authority for the course-of-dealing WAIVER limit on forfeiture, not for a substantial-equity “must foreclose” rule. It confirms forfeiture clauses are valid and enforceable in Arkansas land contracts, subject to waiver. Later cases cite it for waiver: Humke v. Taylor, 282 Ark. 94, 666 S.W.2d 394 (1984) (reversing an eviction and transferring to chancery because the seller had accepted late payments for six years), and harvison-v-charles-e-davis-1992 (which combines waiver with the buyer’s substantial equity to hold forfeiture unavailable).
- Good-law status: Good law; the lead Arkansas precedent on waiver of an installment-contract forfeiture.
- Cases cited / relied on: White v. Page, 216 Ark. 632, 226 S.W.2d 973 (1950) (forfeiture clauses valid/enforceable); Friar v. Baldridge, 91 Ark. 133 (1909); Berry v. Crawford, 237 Ark. 380 (1963); Cordell v. Enis, 162 Ark. 41 (1924); Vernon v. McEntire, 232 Ark. 741 (1960); Williams v. Shaver, 100 Ark. 565 (1911).
- Source (retrieved): Full opinion text retrieved from the Caselaw Access Project (Harvard CAP / static.case.law), 238 Ark. 870. https://static.case.law/ark/238/cases/0870-01.json · Verified: 2026-06-10 (full 1964 opinion text read directly; holding corrected from prior misattribution).
Jurisdictions that follow / cite: arkansas
Disclaimer. Legal information, not legal advice. Confirm the opinion is still good law before relying on it.