Usury & Interest Caps

Legal information, not legal advice. Verify against the cited primary sources before acting. Usury ceilings, the credit-sale/time-price exemption, and the federal-preemption overlay vary by jurisdiction and are amended often. Last verified: 2026-06-08.

• What it is: Usury is the charging of interest above the maximum rate a state allows on a “loan or forbearance” of money. Most states set a general (legal) rate that applies when the parties do not contract in writing, a higher contract ceiling the parties may agree to, and — in many states — a separate criminal-usury threshold above which the charge is a crime and the lender forfeits interest (sometimes principal). On a contract for deed (CFD) / installment land contract, the price is paid over time at a stated rate, so the threshold question is whether the carried balance is a “loan or forbearance” reachable by the usury cap at all, or a bona fide credit sale outside it under the time-price doctrine.

• Why it matters for contract-for-deed: A CFD is structurally a financed purchase, and the seller almost always charges interest above the bare general rate (6–10% in most states). Three things decide whether that rate is lawful: (1) whether the deal is a credit sale (time-price differential — usually not interest, not usury) or a disguised loan the courts will recharacterize and test against the cap; (2) which state ceiling and exemption applies (many states exempt or raise the cap for loans/credit secured by real estate, or for business-purpose credit); and (3) whether federal law preempts the state cap for a first-lien residential deal. Getting this wrong is not a minor foot-fault: a usurious CFD can mean forfeiture of all interest, penalty multiples, voiding of the interest obligation, and in the criminal-usury tier, prosecution — on top of the forfeiture-vs-foreclosure exposure that already governs CFD default (forfeiture-vs-foreclosure).

• The credit-sale / time-price doctrine (the central exemption): The oldest and most important escape hatch is that a sale of property on credit at a higher “time price” than the cash price is not a loan and is not usurious. The U.S. Supreme Court stated the rule in Hogg v. Ruffner, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 115, 118–19 (1861): “if A propose to sell to B a tract of land for $10,000incash,orfor$20,000 payable in ten annual instalments … the contract cannot be called usurious,” because it “has none of the characteristics of usury; it is not for the loan of money, or forbearance of a debt.” A genuine seller-carryback CFD fits this mold — the seller is not lending the buyer money to buy elsewhere; the seller is selling its own land on terms, and the time-price differential between the cash and credit price is price, not interest. California’s Supreme Court applies the same rule by name: the time-price differential “is not interest and hence is not subject to the usury law” (Southwest Concrete Products v. Gosh Construction Corp., 51 Cal. 3d 701, 798 P.2d 1247 (1990)), and an extension or renegotiation of an exempt carryback sale stays exempt (Ghirardo v. Antonioli, 8 Cal. 4th 791, 883 P.2d 960 (1994)). Southwest Concrete is also a caution on the doctrine’s mechanics: the differential exists only where the seller actually offers one cash price and a separate, higher credit price. There the seller offered a single price with a 1.5%/month (18%/yr) late charge and so had no time-price differential to invoke; the court nonetheless upheld the late charge as outside the usury law, treating the deal as a “single-payment credit sale” rather than a loan or forbearance (51 Cal. 3d at 705–06). The lesson for a CFD operator is to fix a stated time price at inception rather than assume the label does the work. Limits of the doctrine: it protects a bona fide credit sale fixed at inception; it does not shelter (a) a disguised loan dressed up as a sale, or (b) states that have narrowed or rejected the doctrine by statute or decision. Several states bring CFD interest inside the usury/consumer-credit regime expressly — e.g. Ohio’s ceiling statute names the “land installment contract” as a secured transaction whose rate it governs (ORC § 1343.01(B)), and Indiana’s Uniform Consumer Credit Code treats a consumer land contract as a “mortgage transaction” subject to its finance-charge cap (IC 24-4.5).

• Penalties — why this is not academic: Usury penalties are among the harshest in commercial law and run state by state. Texas is the archetype: charging usurious interest exposes the creditor to forfeiture of the interest plus a penalty of three times the usurious interest amount and, for interest greater than twice the lawful rate, forfeiture of principal and interest (Tex. Fin. Code ch. 305). New York voids the obligation entirely as to civil usury and makes a knowing charge above 25% criminal usury (Penal Law § 190.40). Florida makes interest above 18% a forfeiture event and above 25% a crime, with the obligation’s interest forfeited (Fla. Stat. §§ 687.04, 687.071). The common pattern: the seller loses at least the offending interest; the worst tiers cost principal and/or carry criminal liability. (Statute-by-statute penalty figures beyond the general statutes cited are flagged in needs_verification — confirm the current penalty section in the operative state before relying on a multiplier.)

• Federal preemption — the residential first-lien override: State usury caps do not have the last word on every CFD. DIDMCA § 501, 12 U.S.C. § 1735f-7a, preempts “the provisions of the constitution or the laws of any State expressly limiting the rate or amount of interest, discount points, finance charges, or other charges” for any “loan, mortgage, credit sale, or advance” that is (A) “secured by a first lien on residential real property” (or a residential manufactured home or co-op share) and (B) made after March 31, 1980. Congress gave states a three-year window (April 1, 1980 – April 1, 1983) to opt out; a handful did (e.g. several states reinstated their caps), so preemption is not uniform and must be checked state by state. Because a first-lien residential CFD is a “credit sale … secured by a first lien on residential real property,” § 1735f-7a can preempt the state usury ceiling for it — but only where the state has not opted out and the deal meets the statutory definition (first lien, residential, post-1980). Relatedly, the Dodd-Frank / SAFE-Act seller-financer overlay does not set a usury rate, but the CFPB’s seller-financing exclusions and the agency’s adjustable-rate guidance presuppose a rate “not to exceed the applicable usury limit” (dodd-frank-seller-financing, safe-act-mlo) — i.e. federal consumer-finance compliance still routes back through the state cap that DIDMCA may or may not have preempted.

• Operator takeaway: Before you set a CFD rate, run the four-step test. (1) Is it a bona fide credit sale? If you are selling your own land on terms and fix the time price at inception, the time-price doctrine (Hogg v. Ruffner; in CA, Southwest Concrete / Ghirardo) likely puts the differential outside usury — but do not rely on it where the state has narrowed it or where the deal looks like a disguised loan or a post-hoc default-rate add-on. (2) What is the state ceiling and does it have a real-estate / business-purpose exemption? Many states raise or remove the cap for credit secured by real estate (Ohio names land installment contracts; California exempts broker-arranged real-property loans); others (NY) keep a hard civil/criminal cap even on residential deals. (3) Does DIDMCA preempt? A first-lien residential CFD made after 3/31/1980 in a non-opt-out state may have no enforceable state rate cap under 12 U.S.C. § 1735f-7a. (4) Stay clear of the criminal tier regardless. Even where the time-price doctrine or preemption arguably applies, pricing into a state’s criminal-usury band (often 25%+) invites recharacterization litigation you do not want. When in doubt, document the cash price vs. time price, keep the rate under the lowest plausibly-applicable ceiling, and get an opinion in the operative state.

▸ For Sellers / Operators — Compliance-critical facts, in order: (1) The time-price doctrine is your primary shield, not a blanket immunity. A genuine seller-carryback CFD with the credit price fixed at closing is usually outside usury (Hogg v. Ruffner, 66 U.S. 115; Southwest Concrete, 51 Cal. 3d 701) — but the differential only exists where you actually fix a stated time price at inception (Southwest Concrete found none where a single price carried only a late charge), and a disguised loan or a state that has codified CFD interest into its usury/consumer-credit regime (Ohio § 1343.01(B); Indiana UCCC, IC 24-4.5) can pull you back inside the cap. (2) Know your state’s three numbers: the general rate, the contract ceiling, and the criminal-usury line. In NY there is no high-dollar escape for a 1–2-family residence — civil 16% (GOL § 5-501 / Banking Law § 14-a), criminal 25% (Penal Law § 190.40). In TX the legal rate is 10% (Tex. Fin. Code § 302.001) with a higher ceiling under ch. 303, and the penalties are brutal (ch. 305: treble interest; principal forfeiture above twice the lawful rate). In FL civil 18% / criminal 25% (§§ 687.03, 687.071). In CA the constitutional cap is 7%/10% but real-property loans made or arranged by a licensed broker are exempt (Cal. Const. art. XV, § 1). In OH the 8% general rate (ORC 1343.01(A)) is expressly raised for a “land installment contract” (1343.01(B)). (3) Check DIDMCA preemption for a first-lien residential deal — 12 U.S.C. § 1735f-7a may preempt the state cap unless your state opted out 1980–83. (4) Usury penalties typically cost you all the interest at minimum and can reach principal and criminal liability — never price into the criminal band on a time-price theory you have not confirmed.

▸ For Buyers — Usury is a defense and a counterclaim, not just a seller’s problem. If the rate on your CFD exceeds the state ceiling and the deal is found to be a loan rather than a bona fide credit sale, you may be able to void the interest (sometimes recover penalties or principal forfeiture) — ask whether the “interest” is really a time-price differential, whether a late/default rate was added after closing, and whether the cap was preempted by DIDMCA. Rates in or near the criminal-usury band (often 25%+) are a red flag worth counsel.

Jurisdiction map

Positions are stated where a retrieved primary source supports them; rows whose controlling statute was carried from an audited per-state page but not re-pulled verbatim this run (Ohio § 1343.01, Indiana § 24-4.5-3-201, Minnesota ch. 334, and the Texas ch. 303/305 and Florida § 687.071 penalty mechanics) are flagged in needs_verification below — treat their specific figures as provisional until the section text is confirmed. The “general civil ceiling” is the headline cap; nearly every state also has a separate criminal-usury line and one or more exemptions (real-property credit, business-purpose, broker-arranged, or the time-price doctrine) that frequently move a CFD out from under the headline number. The federal DIDMCA preemption of state caps for first-lien residential credit applies across jurisdictions that did not opt out. Per-state §1/§6 modules carry the deal-specific detail.

Position	Jurisdiction(s)	Controlling authority (primary source)
General 10% legal rate; higher ceiling by statute; severe penalties — maximum rate is 10%/yr “except as otherwise provided by law” (§ 302.001); separate ch. 303 ceiling and ch. 305 penalties (interest forfeiture + treble; principal forfeiture above 2× lawful rate)	texas	Tex. Fin. Code § 302.001 (10% legal rate); chs. 303, 305 (ceiling, penalties)
Constitutional 7%/10% cap with a broad real-property/broker exemption + time-price doctrine — 7% general, 10% for personal/family/household; loans “made or arranged by” a licensed RE broker and secured by real property are exempt; bona fide credit sales are outside usury under the time-price differential	california	Cal. Const. art. XV, § 1; Southwest Concrete Products v. Gosh Construction Corp., 51 Cal. 3d 701 (1990); Ghirardo v. Antonioli, 8 Cal. 4th 791 (1994)
Hard civil 16% / criminal 25% — no high-dollar escape for a 1–2-family residence — civil ceiling set by Banking Law § 14-a via GOL § 5-501; § 5-501(6)(a)‘s commercial exemption expressly does not apply to a loan secured primarily by a 1–2-family residence; criminal usury at 25%	new-york	N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law § 5-501; Banking Law § 14-a; Penal Law § 190.40
**Civil 18% (≤$500k)/criminal25$500k or less; above $500k the operative ceiling is the 25% criminal-usury line; charging above 25% is a crime	florida	Fla. Stat. § 687.03 (18%/$500k); § 687.071 (25%/45% criminal)
8% general rate expressly raised for a “land installment contract” — CFD interest is brought inside the ceiling statute, which then authorizes a higher contracted rate for a loan secured by a mortgage, deed of trust, or land installment contract on real estate	ohio	Ohio Rev. Code § 1343.01(A)–(B)
CFD treated as a consumer “mortgage transaction” under the UCCC; finance-charge cap applies — a land contract is a consensual security interest equivalent to a mortgage; consumer-loan finance charge capped (25%/yr on agreements after 6/30/2020)	indiana	Ind. Code § 24-4.5-3-201 (UCCC loan-finance-charge cap)
Default 6% / contract ceiling 8% (general usury chapter) — § 334.01 sets the no-written-agreement default and the ceiling on the rate that may be taken; applicability of the cap to a seller-carry CFD is the open question	minnesota	Minn. Stat. ch. 334 (§ 334.01)
Federal floor — preempts state caps for first-lien residential credit — state constitutional/statutory rate limits “shall not apply” to a loan, mortgage, credit sale, or advance secured by a first lien on residential real property, made after 3/31/1980, unless the state opted out 1980–83	all (non-opt-out)	12 U.S.C. § 1735f-7a (DIDMCA § 501)
Foundational time-price authority — applies wherever the doctrine is recognized — a sale of property on credit at a higher “time price” than cash is not a loan or forbearance and is not usurious	all (where not narrowed)	Hogg v. Ruffner, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 115 (1861)

How the regimes compare

• The doctrinal fork — credit sale vs. loan. The single most important variable is whether a state’s courts treat a seller-carryback CFD as a bona fide credit sale (time-price differential, not interest — outside usury) or are willing to recharacterize it as a loan. Hogg v. Ruffner, 66 U.S. 115 (1861), is the national anchor; California applies it expressly (Southwest Concrete, Ghirardo). Where the doctrine holds, the headline ceiling is largely irrelevant to a genuine carryback. Where a state has codified CFD interest into its credit regime (Ohio § 1343.01(B) names land installment contracts; Indiana’s UCCC treats the land contract as a consumer mortgage transaction), the cap applies directly and the time-price argument is unavailable or limited.

• Texas — modest legal rate, draconian penalties. The legal rate is only 10% (Tex. Fin. Code § 302.001), with a higher ceiling available under ch. 303. What makes Texas distinctive is ch. 305: usurious interest is forfeited and trebled, and interest more than twice the lawful rate forfeits principal and interest. A Texas operator should be especially careful that the CFD rate sits under the applicable ceiling or squarely within a recognized exemption.

• California — exemption-rich. The bare constitutional caps (7% general / 10% personal-family-household, art. XV § 1) are widely escaped: broker-arranged real-property loans are exempt, and a bona fide carryback is outside usury under the time-price doctrine (Southwest Concrete, 51 Cal. 3d 701). The practical California rule for CFDs is “rely on an exemption, not the bare 7%/10% number.”

• New York — the hard case. NY keeps a civil 16% / criminal 25% structure (GOL § 5-501 / Banking Law § 14-a; Penal Law § 190.40) and, critically, removes the high-dollar commercial exemption for loans secured primarily by a 1–2-family residence (§ 5-501(6)(a)). Whether a given carryback CFD is a “loan or forbearance” versus a time-price credit sale is fact-specific, so a NY operator cannot assume the exemption — the residential cap is the realistic constraint.

• Florida — 18% with a criminal cliff. Civil ceiling 18% on loans ≤ $500k(\S 687.03);above$500k the operative ceiling is the 25% criminal line (§ 687.071), with charges above 25% (to 45%) a misdemeanor and above 45% a felony. Interest above the civil cap is forfeited.

• Federal preemption — check before you assume any cap binds. For a first-lien residential CFD made after March 31, 1980, 12 U.S.C. § 1735f-7a preempts the state rate cap entirely — the deal is a “credit sale … secured by a first lien on residential real property.” The catch is the 1980–83 opt-out: a minority of states reinstated their caps, so preemption must be verified state by state, and it does not reach junior-lien or non-residential deals.

Primary sources (retrieved 2026-06-08)

• Hogg v. Ruffner, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 115 (1861) — a credit sale at a higher time price than cash “cannot be called usurious”; it “has none of the characteristics of usury; it is not for the loan of money, or forbearance of a debt.” https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/66/115
• Southwest Concrete Products v. Gosh Construction Corp., 51 Cal. 3d 701, 798 P.2d 1247 (1990) — the time-price differential “is not interest and hence is not subject to the usury law”; but the differential exists only where the seller offers a separate cash and credit price. The court found no differential on a single-price sale carrying a 1.5%/month (18%/yr) late charge, yet affirmed the charge as a “single-payment credit sale” outside usury (not a loan or forbearance) — a caution that the exemption turns on a genuinely fixed time price, not the label. Retrieved via Stanford SCOCAL (Justia mirror returned HTTP 403 this run). https://scocal.stanford.edu/opinion/southwest-concrete-products-v-gosh-construction-corp-31261
• 12 U.S.C. § 1735f-7a (DIDMCA § 501) — state constitutional/statutory limits on “the rate or amount of interest … shall not apply to any loan, mortgage, credit sale, or advance” secured by a first lien on residential real property, made after March 31, 1980; states could opt out April 1, 1980 – April 1, 1983. https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/12/1735f-7a
• Cal. Const. art. XV, § 1 — 7% general / 10% personal-family-household usury ceiling; exemption for real-property loans “made or arranged by” a licensed real estate broker. https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displayText.xhtml?lawCode=CONS&article=XV
• Fla. Stat. § 687.03 — civil usury ceiling 18%/yr on loans of $500,000orless;above$500k the ceiling is the rate “prescribed in s. 687.071.” https://www.flsenate.gov/Laws/Statutes/2024/687.03
• N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law § 5-501 — civil usury ceiling is 6% “unless a different rate is prescribed in section fourteen-a of the banking law”; § 5-501(6)(a)‘s high-dollar commercial exemption expressly does not apply to a loan “secured primarily by an interest in real property improved by a one or two family residence.” https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/laws/GOB/5-501
• Tex. Fin. Code § 302.001 — “The maximum rate or amount of interest is 10 percent a year except as otherwise provided by law.” https://texas.public.law/statutes/tex._fin._code_section_302.001

Meta

• needs_verification:
  • N.Y. Banking Law § 14-a verbatim 16% figure — GOL § 5-501 was retrieved and confirms it incorporates § 14-a as the operative civil rate (over the 6% default), and the 1–2-family-residence carve-out from the commercial exemption was retrieved verbatim. The 16% number is corroborated by official-source search results (NYS DFS banking interpretations; multiple practitioner summaries) but the § 14-a statutory text was not pulled verbatim this run. Confirm on nysenate.gov before quoting the section text.
  • N.Y. Penal Law § 190.40 (criminal usury, 25%) — the 25%/yr second-degree criminal-usury threshold and class-E-felony grade are corroborated by official sources this run (nysenate.gov and nycourts.gov CJI for § 190.40); the section text was not pulled verbatim.
  • Ohio Rev. Code § 1343.01(A)–(B) — the 8% general rate and the express “land installment contract” higher-rate authorization are carried from the audited ohio page; the codes.ohio.gov text was not retrievable this run (server refused). Confirm subsection (B)‘s land-installment-contract language and the fourth-district commercial-paper catch-all rate before relying on it.
  • Tex. Fin. Code ch. 303 (ceiling) and ch. 305 (penalties: treble interest; principal forfeiture above 2× lawful rate) — the penalty multipliers are the well-known Texas usury structure but the specific ch. 305 sections were not retrieved verbatim this run; confirm the operative penalty section and current multiplier before advising.
  • Fla. Stat. §§ 687.04 / 687.071 penalty mechanics (interest forfeiture; 25%/45% criminal tiers) — § 687.03’s 18%/$500k ceiling and the cross-reference to § 687.071 were retrieved; the precise forfeiture/criminal-tier language of §§ 687.04 and 687.071 was not retrieved verbatim this run.
  • Ind. Code § 24-4.5-3-201 (UCCC 25%/yr consumer-loan finance-charge cap; land contract as “mortgage transaction”) — carried from the audited indiana page; not independently retrieved this run. Confirm the post-6/30/2020 cap and its application to a seller-financed consumer CFD.
  • Minn. Stat. § 334.01 (6% default / 8% ceiling) and whether that general chapter actually binds a seller-carry CFD versus being displaced by the time-price doctrine or ch. 559A — flagged on the minnesota page; not resolved here.
  • DIDMCA opt-out roster — which specific states exercised the 1980–83 opt-out (and thus where § 1735f-7a does not preempt the state cap) was not enumerated from a primary source this run; verify state-by-state before relying on preemption.
  • Ghirardo v. Antonioli, 8 Cal. 4th 791 (1994) — VERIFIED this run. The Cal. Supreme Court (rev’g) held the notes “were instead the functional equivalent of a modification to a credit sale that was exempt from the usury law,” confirming the “modification/extension of an exempt carryback stays exempt” point (CourtListener, Google Scholar, vLex). Pacific Reporter pinpoint corrected from 883 P.2d 860 → 883 P.2d 960 (digit transposition). Opinion not pulled verbatim for a direct quote; confirm exact language before quoting.
  • Per-jurisdiction classification beyond TX, CA, NY, FL, OH, IN, MN — each state’s headline ceiling, real-estate/business-purpose exemption, criminal-usury line, and time-price posture should be placed from its own retrieved statute/case; the §1/§6 modules of the per-state pages carry partial data harvested but not all re-confirmed here.
• open_questions:
  • In states that have codified CFD interest into a consumer-credit regime (OH, IN), is the time-price doctrine fully displaced, or does it still shelter a non-consumer (business-purpose) carryback? Normalize per state.
  • Where DIDMCA preempts the rate cap for a first-lien residential CFD, do state consumer-protection/UDAP doctrines still police an unconscionable rate even though the usury cap is preempted? (12 C.F.R. § 590.3(c) preserves some borrower protections.) Track per state.
  • Does a wrap/junior-lien CFD (wrap-around-mortgage) lose DIDMCA first-lien preemption because the buyer’s interest sits behind the seller’s senior loan, re-exposing the deal to the state cap? Flag for the wrap and federal pages.
• cross_links: forfeiture-vs-foreclosure · installment-land-contract · dodd-frank-seller-financing · safe-act-mlo · irc-453-installment-sale · wrap-around-mortgage · liquidated-damages-vs-penalty · texas · california · new-york · florida · ohio · indiana · minnesota
• changelog:
  • 2026-06-08 — Page created. Defined usury as applied to seller-financed CFDs: the general/contract/criminal ceiling structure; the credit-sale / time-price doctrine as the central exemption (Hogg v. Ruffner, 66 U.S. 115; Southwest Concrete, 51 Cal. 3d 701) and its limits (post-hoc default rates, disguised loans, states that codify CFD interest — OH § 1343.01(B), IN UCCC); state penalty patterns (TX ch. 305 treble/principal forfeiture; NY void + criminal; FL forfeiture + criminal); and federal DIDMCA preemption of state caps for first-lien residential credit sales (12 U.S.C. § 1735f-7a, with the 1980–83 opt-out caveat). Built the jurisdiction-split table from primary sources retrieved this run: Hogg v. Ruffner; Southwest Concrete; 12 U.S.C. § 1735f-7a; Cal. Const. art. XV § 1; Fla. Stat. § 687.03; N.Y. GOL § 5-501; Tex. Fin. Code § 302.001. Flagged NY § 14-a 16% verbatim, Ohio § 1343.01 text, TX ch. 303/305 penalty sections, FL §§ 687.04/ 687.071, IN § 24-4.5-3-201, MN § 334.01, the DIDMCA opt-out roster, and Ghirardo under needs_verification.
  • 2026-06-08 — Adversarial citation audit. Re-retrieved Hogg v. Ruffner (verbatim), 12 U.S.C. § 1735f-7a (verbatim), Cal. Const. art. XV § 1 (verbatim), Fla. Stat. § 687.03 (verbatim), N.Y. GOL § 5-501 (verbatim incl. 1–2-family carve-out), and Tex. Fin. Code § 302.001 (verbatim) — all confirmed. Corrected a mischaracterization of Southwest Concrete: the prior text said the case “disallowed an 18% late charge” / that the doctrine “does not shelter a post-hoc late charge”; in fact the Cal. Supreme Court affirmed the 18%/yr late charge as not usurious (a “single-payment credit sale,” not a loan/forbearance), finding only that there was no time-price differential on a single-price sale. Rewrote the doctrine-limits passage, the For-Sellers note, and the Primary-Sources entry to state the holding correctly; swapped the dead Justia URL (HTTP 403) for the Stanford SCOCAL opinion. Corrected Ghirardo Pacific Reporter cite 883 P.2d 860 → 883 P.2d 960 and verified its credit-sale-modification holding (CourtListener/Scholar/vLex). Corroborated NY § 14-a (16%) and Penal Law § 190.40 (25%) against official sources. Confirmed all 14 wiki-links resolve to existing pages.

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Disclaimer. This page is legal information, not legal advice, and may be out of date. Usury ceilings, the scope of the credit-sale / time-price exemption, criminal- usury thresholds, and the reach of federal DIDMCA preemption vary by jurisdiction and are frequently amended. Whether a particular contract for deed is a bona fide credit sale or a loan reachable by the usury cap is fact-specific. Confirm the current statute and that any cited authority is still good law before pricing, selling, or buying on a CFD, and consult a licensed attorney in the relevant jurisdiction.